The article begins with a discussion of prior research relating to international persuasive communication, the role of the media in recent Russian foreign policy, and Ukrainian public opinion.
The study's research design is then explained, and models are presented which predict support for the Russian strategic narrative among Ukrainians. The final sections of the article reflect on the implications of the study's findings and elaborate on how to incorporate the idea of linkage into a theory of strategic narrative reception. The article argues for a more holistic appreciation of how views of international politics shape and are shaped by the social and communicative practices of individuals. It uses the idea of linkage to move debates about narrative reception and persuasive 'power' beyond the simplistic 'stimulus-response' view of media effects.
International persuasive communication: Concepts and theory
What explains the ability or failure of a particular state to win support and approval among foreign populations? Nye would frame that question as what makes a state 'attractive' and his answer would point to the given state's policies, culture, and values, along with their effective communication. The '(re)sources' of Nye's soft power are not all controlled by governments: he allows that civil society, non-governmental organisations and private commercial actors can all be involved in 'generating attraction' for their country of origin.
16 But government officials across the world are operating in the belief that their own state-funded soft power projects can make a positive difference -and it is these efforts which have attracted most attention in the soft power literature. A wealth of studies describe the measures state officials are taking in their desire to shape international public opinion, 17 and political discourse surrounding these measures has also been researched. 18 What is missing from this literature, however, is evidence-based theory regarding how perceptions of foreign countries take shape among mass publics. The exercise of soft power is discussed as 'a long-term process that should be barely noticeable', 19 which almost excludes the prospect of tracing it empirically. Consequently, the soft power concept has become in practice 'a complex of assumptions about the modalities of influence'; 20 it is much more about what states do for influence than about how influence is actually achieved.
Two assumptions are particularly integral to soft power policies and scholarship. The first is that an individual is likely to look more favourably on a foreign country after getting to know its language and way of life: familiarity and personal contact are expected to engender affinity. This underlies the allocation of state funding to exchange programmes and language/cultural institutes, 21 as well as expectations that an internationalised higher education sector will produce soft power dividends.
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The second assumption is that certain kinds of journalistic output are likely to produce more positive public evaluations of particular states. Opinions vary as to what kind of journalism will generate the desired effect: the UK government believes it benefits from the BBC's reputation for impartiality,
23
whereas other governments prefer their international broadcasters to take a more overtly patriotic line. Either way, confidence in the mass media's ability to shape foreign public opinion is reflected in state financing for a multitude of internationally-oriented channels, news agencies, websites and publications.
24
What evidence supports these two core soft power assumptions? In the field of social psychology there is considerable if qualified support for intergroup contact theory -the idea that greater personal interaction with an outgroup reduces prejudice and hostility towards that outgroup, provided certain conditions are met. 25 An inverse relationship between contact and prejudice at the individual level has been found across many contexts, so it seems reasonable to expect a person to think more highly (or at least less negatively) about citizens from a particular foreign country, the more (s)he interacts with citizens of that country through travel, international exchanges and so on.
The extent to which affinity towards foreign individuals translates into to affinity towards the foreign state and its policies is less clear, however. 26 It is worth noting the argument of Hugh Forbes, 27 who suggests that contact at an individual level can ultimately exacerbate tensions at an aggregate level, because contact leads to assimilation, which may be resented by sections of the community that is being assimilated.
Evidence to support the assumption that the media shape public opinion about foreign states likewise exists without being clear-cut. One recent study found a weak but positive relationship between China's 'media footprint' in African countries (i.e. Chinese involvement in local media environments) and the likelihood of those countries' citizens looking favourably upon Chinese influence. 28 However, the impact of media content was hard to assess, since the 'media footprint' variable was based on Chinese telecom investment as well as the presence or absence of several Chinese news outlets. In earlier research, William Gamson's classic focus-group study of how individuals construct meaning from the news suggested that media discourse was more influential than 'popular wisdom' and 'experiential knowledge' where foreign affairs (specifically, the ArabIsraeli conflict) were concerned. 29 Paul Brewer and colleagues found that students evaluated Mexico and Columbia more highly following exposure to stories which framed those countries as American allies in the war on drugs. The authors concluded that 'a clear story -a frame that explains what issue is at stake and on which side of the issue the foreign nation stands' could shape how a mass This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395 . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. Ukraine was highlighted as a priority partner, which the Russian leadership wanted to draw into 'deeper processes of integration'. 49 Essentially, the Russian leadership was hoping most Ukrainians would fall into line with its preferred narrative about their identity -as a population with historic, linguistic and cultural ties to Russia that ought to be preserved in new structures of regional alliance.
With this aim in mind they made every effort preserve channels of communication from Russia to the mass Ukrainian audience, but outcomes ultimately fell well short of their aspirations.
Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia before and after the 'revolution of dignity'
At least until 2014, attitudes towards Russia were one of the main lines of cleavage in Ukrainian politics. 50 An extensive area studies literature addresses the fluctuating but fairly even divide in
Ukrainian public opinion about relations with Russia that existed during the first 20 or so years of Ukraine's independence. This literature, based on nationally representative surveys, is almost completely detached from research on soft power and persuasive cross-border communication. well-off and older were the factors most frequently associated with 'pro-Russian' (and correspondingly 'anti-Western') sentiments. However, there was some disagreement as to whether region of residence had an autonomous effect, or whether observed regional variations were due to the 'compositional' influence of linguistic, ethnic and religious differences. 53 Another point of debate was how to treat variables which do not lend themselves to straightforward categorisation; in Ukraine this applies to region, language and ethnicity. It is striking that media consumption was not included as a predictor in any of the listed studies -despite use of Russia-based media having been widespread in Ukraine for a long time and television being considered a major influence on geopolitical imaginations.
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The studies in Table 1 are all based on fieldwork which predates 'Euromaidan' and the 'revolution of dignity' ('revolyutsiya hidnosti') which ousted Viktor Yanukovych from the Ukrainian presidency in This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395 . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. drawing Ukraine into regional integration initiatives has entirely disappeared from the agenda.
From 'soft power' to linkage and strategic narrative reception
If we return to thinking about how international persuasive communication is theorised, it should be clear why the 'soft power' framework is problematic. In Russia, Ukraine, the USA and Europe, stateled international communication is being discussed in adversarial terms. This reflects the reality that government initiatives to persuade and attract were never quite as 'softly' non-disruptive as their proponents claimed, regardless of the states involved. Any communication aimed at persuasion has a competitive dimension, because persuasion only has meaning in contexts where opposing views are vying for acceptance. Likewise, 'attraction' only really matters when alternative centres of gravity are available. Nye underplays the competitive side of his soft power concept, insisting that 'it is a mistake to see public diplomacy simply in adversarial terms... often there can be gains for both sides'. 61 But his much-cited assertion that foreign policy success depends on 'whose story wins'
(emphasis added) betrays a contradictory perspective that may be closer to reality: if one side 'wins', there surely has to be a 'losing' side too. 62 It is fear of being undermined by geopolitical rivals which has driven the Russian government's intensification of propaganda,This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
Page 10 The strategic narrative framework has the additional advantage of being relatively straightforward to operationalise for a study of reception -more so than the vague notion of 'attraction' on which the soft power framework is based. The key elements of a particular strategic narrative (issues problematized, claims of causality and solutions advocated) can be identified from official statements and state-funded media content, then used as the basis for carefully designed questions, which are posed to different target audiences to assess whether they find the narrative convincing.
The strategic narrative framework is therefore adopted to structure the following empirical analysis of persuasive communication in Ukraine. Three expectations derived from the earlier discussion of
'soft power' are tested; namely:
Hypothesis 1: Greater reliance on Russian news sources will predict greater support for the Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian strategic narrative. This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. Three expectations derived from the area studies literature on Ukrainian public opinion are also investigated:
Hypothesis 4: Being born in Russia will predict stronger support for the Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian strategic narrative.
Hypothesis 5:
A preference for watching television in the Russian language rather than in Ukrainian will predict stronger support for the Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian strategic narrative.
Hypothesis 6: Regular attendance of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate will predict stronger support for the Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian strategic narrative.
Before proceeding to the research itself, a few important comments about these hypotheses are in order. First, the hypotheses should not be interpreted as claims of mono-directional causality.
Variations in media use, personal connections, language preferences and church attendance are expected to 'predict' variations in support for the Russian and Ukrainian strategic narratives, but only in the statistical sense. Varying support for the narratives might equally 'predict' varying patterns of media use, personal connections and so on. The problem of assessing causal direction in the hypothesised relationships will be discussed in the article's concluding sections.
Second, hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 have been formulated in a way that attempts to correct as much as possible for problems of endogeneity and categorisation that were not always recognised in previous research on Ukrainian public opinion. Ukraine qualify to be Russian 'compatriots' if they wish -so whether or not they describe their identity as Russian (fully or partially) reflects the appeal of Moscow's strategic narrative relative to other, more local (and not necessarily strategic) narratives about identity. This is why the hypotheses in this study do not rely on ethnic, linguistic or religious self-identification, but rather on the less abstract measures of birthplace and habitual practices. The language hypothesis is formulated deliberately around passive language ability (TV viewing) instead of active language ability (speaking), because exposure to narratives depends more on the ability to understand than to speak fluently. Clear categorisation between Russian and Ukrainian also makes more sense in the context of television, where surzhyk (mixing of Russian and Ukrainian) is less common than in interpersonal communication. The hypothesis about religion focuses specifically on attendance of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate because this church has lately been described as one of the Kremlin's soft power 'tools'. 70 A regional effect is not hypothesised at all because the data used in this study come from only one Ukrainian region. The demographic variables found to be This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
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Reception of Russia's strategic narrative in Ukraine: an empirical analysis
The data used in this study come from an original survey conducted between 6 and 18 February 2016 by the market research company TNS Ukraine. The sample of 1,000 respondents was representative of the adult population of Odesa Region. 73 The survey was restricted to a single region (oblast) partly due to budget limitations, but also in order to set aside the 'regional effect' question while interrogating sub-regional, individual-level explanatory variables more closelyparticularly media use and personal ties to Russia. Odesa Region was selected because it belongs to the 'south-eastern half' of Ukraine which voted for relatively 'pro-Russian' candidates and parties in
Ukrainian elections prior to 2014, yet it is also diverse in terms of its economy and linguistic composition. It has substantive interest in its own right, as it contains Ukraine's third biggest city and is part of the territory named 'Novorossiya' ('New Russia') by Putin and Russian nationalists. was set alight during the unrest, an event described as a 'massacre' by Russian state television.
75
Ukrainian sociologists have since then identified Odesa Region as one where Russian propaganda is 'most effective'.
76
The survey questionnaire had three sections. The first section included questions about respondents' socio-demographic background, personal ties to Russia and other countries, and how often they discussed issues of international relations (for the frequency distribution of variables based on these survey items see Table 2 ).
The second section of the survey pertained to news consumption. Respondents were asked to specify the language in which they preferred to watch TV programmes and to estimate the time they spent consuming news and current affairs via television and the internet (again, see Table 2 ). They were also asked to name all the TV channels, radio stations, publications and websites they used to follow the news 'during a normal week'. Responses were elicited via unaided recall rather presenting respondents with a list, so in aggregate they can be understood as 'mindful' news repertoires rather than 'total' news repertoires. 77 Assessing media use though self-reports is notoriously problematic, but a list-based approach is now widely used and the open-ended list approach has been found to perform better than other techniques as a measure of true exposure.
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Each respondent's reliance on Russian sources was operationalised by dividing the number of mentioned Russian sources by the total number of mentioned news sources. This gives a rough This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. Table 3 ). Even among the minority of respondents who used one or more Russian news source (whether narrowly or broadly defined), these sources rarely constituted more than a third of individual news media repertoires; respondents used more Ukrainian sources than Russian ones.
The third section of the survey questionnaire contained a series of questions intended to gauge support for the conflicting strategic narratives projected by the Russian and Ukrainian leaderships.
Before formulating the questions, the strategic narratives themselves were traced by methodically analysing statements and speeches of the president and foreign minister of each country with the CAQDAS software Atlas.ti. All statements published on the Russian and Ukrainian presidential and During the studied period certain topics were covered by both narratives from contradictory perspectives, and these became the focus of the survey questions. One set of questions asked respondents to state their level of agreement with alternative problem definitions from the two narratives, for example, 'The USA violates the sovereignty of other countries', or 'Russia is trying to destabilize Ukraine'. A second set of questions asked respondents to choose between contradictory causal claims taken from the two narratives, for example, 'Russian support for separatists' versus 'Ukrainian unwillingness to give Donbas special status' as explanations for why the conflict in eastern This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
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Ukraine had not been resolved. A third set of questions asked respondents to choose between contradictory solutions advocated by the rival narratives which might 'improve the situation in the world', for example, the USA and Europe continuing sanctions against Russia, or the USA and Europe cooperating more closely with Russia (for a full list of these questions and the frequency distribution of responses, see Table 4 and Table 5 ).
An exploratory factor analysis was run on the 'problem definition' set of survey items. 83 A two-factor solution was found to account for 74 per cent of total variance (see Table 6 ). All the Russian problem definitions loaded onto Factor 1 and all the Ukrainian problem definitions loaded onto Factor 2, although one Russian problem definition ('Countries of the West and Europe are losing interest in solving Ukraine's problems') cross-loaded and was therefore discarded from the analysis. The two factors were negatively correlated with a coefficient of -0.25.
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A second exploratory factor analysis was run on the 'causality' and 'solution' sets of survey items. 85 A single-factor solution was found to account for 48 per cent of total variance (see Table 7 in the Supplementary Materials).
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The results of these factor analyses are consistent with the existence of two negatively correlated latent variables -support for the Ukrainian strategic narrative and support for the Russian strategic narrative -underlying responses to the narrative-based survey questions. For subsequent analysis, these latent variables are operationalised by standardizing the respondents' scores on each narrative-based survey item, then calculating the unweighted mean of the standardized scores across the items contributing to each factor. 87 This produces three measures of narrative support:
(RV1) agreement with the Ukrainian problem definitions (based on Factor 1 from Table 6 ); (RV2) agreement with the Russian problem definitions (based on Factor 2 from Table 6 ); and (RV3) agreement with the Ukrainian causal attributions and solutions rather than the Russian causal attributions and solutions (based on Factor 1 from Table 7 ). Summary statistics for these three measures are presented in Table 8 . Table 9 presents models which regress the three measures of narrative support (RV1, RV2 and RV3) on the hypothesized explanatory variables. The results support Hypothesis 1 that an individual will support the Russian narrative more (and the Ukrainian narrative less) the more (s)he relies on Russian news sources. Reliance on Russian media -whether narrowly or broadly defined -is among the strongest predictors of disagreement with Ukraine's 'anti-Russian' problem definitions (Models 1
and 2), causal claims and advocated solutions (Models 5 and 6). The association between reliance on This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
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Russian media and supporting Russia's 'anti-Western' problem definitions is somewhat weaker (in Model 3 it is not significant; in Model 4 it is significant only at the 0.1 level) although the coefficients point in the expected direction. It is worth noting that the association between disagreement with the Ukrainian narrative and using Russian news media is not driven solely by the 'narrowly defined' sources (i.e. Russia's main federal channels and state news agency RIA Novosti). The more 'broadly defined' Russian sources (which include the popular social networks Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki)
seem to have an effect of their own which can be observed in 'time spent following news online'
having larger coefficients in Models 1 and 5 (where the narrow definition of Russian media was used) than in Models 2 and 6 (where the broad definition was used). Hypothesis 4 predicted that individuals born in Russia would be more inclined to support Russia's strategic narrative over Ukraine's strategic narrative. This hypothesis was not supported: country of birth had no effect on support for the different narratives in any of the models. This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
Page 18 of 32 Among the socio-demographic and other variables investigated, age, income and the frequency of discussing international issues were the only ones to have significant effects on support for the different narratives. Older age corresponded with lower support for the Ukrainian strategic narrative and higher support for the Russian strategic narrative in all six models. The more often respondents discussed foreign affairs, the more they tended to support the 'anti-Russian' problem definitions, causal claims and advocated solutions from Ukraine's strategic narrative (although no effect was observed on their support for Russia's 'anti-Western' problem definitions). The reason for this association is not entirely clear. It may suggest that political engagement (reflected in frequency of political talk) is higher among more 'patriotic' respondents who have negative views of Russia.
Alternatively, the current social climate in Odesa Region may be more conducive to expressing 'antiRussian' opinions in conversation. The findings for income are contradictory. Models 5 and 6 suggest that greater wealth is associated with more support for Ukraine's strategic narrative over Russia's, yet Models 3 and 4 found the low and middle income groups to be more likely than the lowest and highest income groups to support Russia's 'anti-Western' problem definitions, while income had no significant effect in Models 1 and 2 (respondents are not necessarily open about their incomes; this might have affected results). The variables gender, education level and settlement type, as well as several plausible interaction effects, were tested but not found to be significant. This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
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Linkage, strategic narrative reception and foreign policy 'success'
By sticking to Russian-language TV, travelling regularly to Russia, communicating with acquaintances in Russia, using Russia-based news sources and attending a church headquartered in Moscow, some
Ukrainian citizens maintain a connection to Russia, and these citizens express stronger than average support for the Russian state's narrative about international affairs. On one level, this finding is unsurprising: it is consistent with the basic arguments of prior area studies work that religion and language matter for Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia, as well as widely held (but previously untested) assumptions about 'Russian media influence'.
The new step proposed here is to interpret these expected empirical relationships through the lens of linkage and ongoing processes of cross-border communication. Previous scholarship frequently pointed to identity-related factors -'native' language, 'ethnicity' and declared religion -as explanations for foreign policy preferences and attitudes towards Russia among Ukrainians. But it tended to treat these factors as if they were static and exogenous; it said little about the individual communication-related activities that are integral both to the maintenance of identities and to the reception of competing ideas about international affairs. A relevant finding to emerge from the present analysis is that birthplace -a possible precursor to national identity -was insignificant for narrative reception among the studied population. Yet variables based on regular behaviourschurch attendance, media consumption and interpersonal contact -did matter.
What can be said about 'causality' in the relationship between linkage and strategic narrative reception? As already stated, the intention of this article is not to suggest that the predictor variables of linkage 'cause' variation in attitudes in a one-directional, linear fashion. Linkage should not be understood purely as a proxy for exposure, whereby the 'stimulus' of greater exposure to a given narrative generates an automatic 'response' of greater agreement. An obvious objection to the 'stimulus-response' view is that the relationship over time between exposure to and support for a narrative seems likely to be mutually reinforcing. If an individual sympathises with one narrative more than another, (s)he may be less likely to exclude the favoured narrative from his or her communicative environment, while giving less attention to contradictory perspectives. Over time, accustomisation to the favoured narrative might thereby have a structuring, limiting effect on how the individual understands the international system, 88 rendering certain ideas or values taken-forgranted, but this should be regarded as an 'ongoing, dialectical process' rather than an 'aggregation of isolated causal collisions '. 89 This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
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One can also think of ways besides long-term narrative exposure in which linkage is implicated in the process of narrative reception. Forms of linkage such as religious participation, cross-border travel and close personal relationships generate practical and emotional reasons to value friendly ties between one's own state and another. Imagine someone living in Ukraine who has many friends and relatives in Russia and likes to visit them; or someone who happens to enjoy Russian-made, Russianlanguage entertainment shows much more than Ukrainian-made, Ukrainian-language ones; or someone who prays for the fortunes of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine because they consider it the 'true' authority of faith. All such people might fear seeing something subjectively valuable to them disrupted by antagonistic Russian-Ukrainian relations which make cross-border flows of people and information more awkward. Correspondingly, they have more reason to support narratives that prioritise the restoration of bilateral ties, and to object against narratives which present the restoration of ties as a remote or undesirable prospect. In a sense, the behaviours which constitute linkage are not just conduits for ideas about values, they have value of their own which is liable to inform the reasoning of the people involved. Similarly, linkage is not just a conduit for narratives which establish a discursive divide between 'us' (the collective Self) and 'them' (the Other). Linkage consists of social behaviours through which individuals live out and reify their belonging to collectives that transcend state borders -be it the Orthodox Church, the 'Soviet people' or the 'Russian world'. Given these complexities, linkage cannot be understood as a set of independent variables which 'generate an effect' on attitudes. In the words of one non-positivist scholar:
'the conceptualization of factors as independent forces only impedes understanding of both their dynamic interactions and their cumulative significance over time for the subjects we are trying to understand.'
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Some might regard the proposed idea of linkage as quite compatible with Nye's concept of soft power, given that the latter does stress the importance of interpersonal contact and channels of communication. To the extent that soft power has become a 'nebulous' catchphrase, 91 applied to all kinds of non-military forms of influence, there is some overlap. Yet the book which proclaimed soft power to be 'the means to success in world politics' began by stating that 'soft-power resources are assets that produce attraction', and then identified U.S. international broadcasting to be one such resource which ought to receive greater investment. 92 The implication is that a reasonably straightforward linear relationship exists between the intensity of a state's efforts to project a particular message and its prospect of achieving foreign policy goals. The crucial fact that a projected message is likely to elicit diverse responses in the context of competition from other messengers This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. resent its growing influence and seek to counter it. The outcome would thus be rising tension with potential for instability, which might be far from the goal State A had hoped to achieve. The problem mirrors that described by Forbes in relation to the contact hypothesis: an increase in inter-group affinity at the individual level does not necessarily mean conflict will decrease at the aggregate level.
96 Success in projecting a narrative which resonates is one thing; success in achieving foreign policy goals may be quite another -so the fact these issues are conflated so regularly is problematic.
In recent years both Western and Russian efforts to shape public opinion in foreign countries have This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395 . Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
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Reframing debates about state-led persuasion in international relations
This article has identified a set of individual behaviours which predict variation in the reception of strategic narratives in Ukraine. It has adopted and adapted the concept of linkage to explain how these behaviours might play a role in narrative acceptance. Breaking from previous research on 'soft power', it has also pointed out that the acceptance of a strategic narrative by a target audience
should not automatically be equated with 'foreign policy success' if negative responses from other audiences, including rival states, are elicited as well.
The arguments developed here about the role of linkage are based on data from one Ukrainian region, and this raises questions about their broader relevance. It would be worth conducting similar studies elsewhere in Ukraine, for a start, to ascertain whether the observed relationships hold in other regions. The prospect of replicating the findings more widely within Ukraine would appear to be strong, given that language-and religion-related variables are already established as predictors of Ukrainian attitudes about Russia. In the present study, language use and religion were measured and interpreted in a slightly different way to usual (emphasising concrete social or communicative behaviours rather than abstract identities) and media use and interpersonal ties were introduced as important aspects of linkage that had previously been neglected. Future studies could perhaps compare the behaviour-based variables used here with more traditional measures of religious, linguistic and ethno-national identity, to see how they interact and which approach has the greater explanatory power.
Looking beyond Ukraine, individual-level linkage seems most likely to affect strategic narrative reception in contexts where history or geography have allowed it to develop over time. Strategic narrative reception would need to be explained by other factors in cases where the extent of individual social and communicative linkage is too limited for its role to be significant. Linkage between Russia and Ukraine is unusually extensive -there are not many states, even neighbouring ones, whose populations are so linguistically, culturally and historically intertwined. It should be noted that the Russian news sources used by a substantial minority of Odesa Region residents are
Russian domestic news sources; they were not designed to be 'international broadcasters' for foreign citizens. In most parts of the world, consumption of news from foreign sources will probably not be as high as it is in Odesa Region. Dedicated 'international broadcasters' that try to reach This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. This article set out to explain the reception of two strategic (long-term) narratives that are clearly 'geopolitical' in nature -they describe 'heroes and antagonists' on the international stage. The reception of messages that are less strategic and less geopolitical would probably be less affected by linkage. For example, the Russian government is accused of financing all kinds of media content that worked to Donald Trump's advantage in the 2016 American presidential election (particularly conspiracy theories and leaks damaging to Hillary Clinton). Reception of this more 'tactical' kind of messaging about specific domestic political issues lies beyond the scope of this study.
A general conclusion of the present article is that 'soft power' should cease to be the default label for the study and practice of mass persuasion in international politics. Soft power implies that efforts to change political preferences among foreign populations are benign and unobtrusive; in reality they may provoke resentment and retaliation. Soft power implies that states 'get what they want' by persuading foreign audiences, but this is questionable when persuasion or attempts to persuade are followed by backlash and division. The same resources which help 'attract' some Ukrainians to Russia (i.e. church and media) repel other Ukrainians, because different audiences receive and respond to narratives in different ways. Any resource-based account of how persuasion works is therefore inherently problematic.
This article has suggested that linkage is more than just a conduit for discourse. Cross-border travel and talk, media consumption and religious participation are likely to affect an individual's exposure to different narratives over time. However, their significance for narrative reception may also lie in This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file.
Page 24 of 32 the fact that an individual will resist narratives which 'threaten' the cross-border activities and contacts which (s)he values. This point is pertinent to the promotion of liberal democracy in culturally Russified areas via the media and information campaigns. Unfortunately, the narratives which promote liberal democracy are very often narratives which also depict Russia as a threat and interaction with Russia ('Russian influence') as generally undesirable. If pro-democracy narratives in the media were less thoroughly 'geopoliticised', they might go down better among individuals who have strong ties to Russia which they value and wish to maintain.
Although this article has emphasised the risk of backlash associated with state-led efforts to persuade foreign audiences in a competitive discursive environment, it does not mean to imply that such efforts should not take place. It is inevitable that conflicting strategic narratives will be projected in the course of international politics. From a normative viewpoint, one may consider it right to project narratives promoting democracy irrespective of how non-democratic governments react. However, there should be greater recognition of the fact that the reception of a strategic narrative will sometimes have little to do with how 'skilfully' it is deployed, nor with how widely and actively it is disseminated, nor even with how faithful it is to the 'truth'. Credibility is not an objective property of a source or message, but a receiver perception. 98 Individuals will assess the credibility of strategic narratives against the yardstick of their existing views of the international system -views that are likely to have been shaped over time by the behaviours described in this article as 'linkage'.
Notes
This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379-395. Please cite the published version. This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. All tables are in a separate file. Dilliplane et al. 2013; LaCour and Vavreck 2014; Guess 2014 . Respondents were asked to estimate roughly how much time per day they spent consuming news via each type of platform (TV, radio, press, internet) but not how much time they spent using each individual source, because estimations of the latter would almost certainly be inaccurate. 79 Two potential sources of error in this approach are that responses may vary in their comprehensiveness (e.g. people with extensive news repertoires may not list all sources they use) and some people may name sources which fall into residual response categories (over 130 individually named sources were included as response options, but even this lengthy list is not comprehensive, so various 'other source' response options were included too). To address the first problem, interviewers were instructed to probe several times whether there were 'any more' sources the respondent used regularly. The problem of residual categories cannot be entirely resolved -but the proportion of people whose responses fell into residual ('other') categories was generally low: 7 per cent for TV channels, 6 per cent for radio stations, 3 per cent for websites. The figure was higher for print news sources at 16 per cent -but 'other' print sources are more likely to be local than Russian, given the logistics involved in press distribution. 80 The maximum likelihood method of estimation, the oblique Oblimin rotation and a polychoric correlation matrix were used. 84 The sufficiency of the two-factor solution is supported by the Root Mean Square of Residuals, which was 0.03. The Tucker Lewis Index of Reliability was 0.90 and the Root Mean Square of Error of Approximation was
